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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been more than eighteen years since the Washington Supreme
Court handed down its landmark decision in Hangman Ridge Training
Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Company.1 This was the final decision
in a string of cases in which the court attempted to resolve problems
arising from the application and interpretation of the right to a private
cause of action under Washington's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"). 2
Hangman Ridge changed the face of private causes of action under the
CPA by establishing a stringent five-part test that a private party must
meet in order to establish a CPA violation. In addition, the Hangman
t J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2006; B.A. Economics, Brandeis University,
2003. The author dedicates this Article to his parents, Abraham and Marayart, for their years of
unrelenting love and support. The author would also like to thank Joshua Osborne-Klein and the
Seattle University Law Review for their editing support, and Professor Lorraine Bannai for inspiring
the author to always strive for perfection. Finally, the author wishes to recognize all the support and
encouragement received from friends and family who have been kind enough to tolerate two years
worth of bad law school puns.
1. 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
2. Washington's Consumer Protection statutes are codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86. §
19.86.090 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) confers a private cause of action under the
CPA:
Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of [Wash.
Rev. Code] 19.86.020... may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further
violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her, or both, together with
the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and the court may in its
discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the
actual damages sustained ....
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Ridge court reaffirmed the requirement that private litigants bringing a
CPA claim must show that their action affects the public interest, 3 and it
established a set of general threshold questions to aid courts in
determining whether a particular unfair or deceptive act touches upon the
public interest.4  After the Hangman Ridge decision, Washington
remained in the minority of states with a judicially-imposed public
interest requirement for private causes of action.5
The Hangman Ridge court's motivating force was to address
significant judicial misinterpretation of the CPA's private cause of action
6statute. It was also an opportunity to reevaluate Washington's highly
debated and criticized judicially-imposed public interest requirement.7
However, in the years since Hangman Ridge, the legal significance of the
3. 105 Wash. 2d at 788, 719 P.2d at 537.
4. Id. at 790, 719 P.2d at 538. The Washington Supreme Court first construed WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.86.090 (2005) to require a showing that the conduct in question affected the public
interest in Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash. 2d 331, 334, 544 P.2d 88 (1976) ("It follows that an
act or practice of which a private individual may complain must be one which also would be
vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General under the act.").
5. Most states that permit private causes of action do not specifically require a public interest
showing. Where the public interest element is required, it is generally the result of judicial
interpretation. See, e.g., Marrale v. Gwinnett Place Ford, 609 S.E.2d 659, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(noting that suits brought under GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-390-407 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
Leg. Sess.) must serve the public interest) (citing Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980)); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000) (requiring litigants bringing a cause of action
under Minnesota's Private Attomey General Statute, MINN STAT. § 8.31 (1998), to demonstrate that
a cause of action is of benefit to the public); Oswego Laborer's Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine
Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995) (interpreting N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney
2004)).
6. The CPA private right of action, as created by the legislature, consists of four specific
elements: (1) the defendant must have committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the act or
practice must have occurred "in the conduct of any trade or commerce"; (3) the plaintiff must have
suffered injury to "his business or property"; and (4) there must exist a causal relationship between
the defendant's act or practice and plaintiffs injury. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (West,
WESTLAW through 2005 legislation). However, shortly before Hangman Ridge, Washington courts
had created three other tests to bring private causes of action under the CPA, each with its own
differing set of elements. See discussion infra Part lI.B.; see Milton G. Rowland, The Consumer
Protection Act Private Right ofAct: A Reevaluation, 19 GONz. L. REV. 673, 675-77 (1984).
7. The gist of criticism surrounding the public interest requirement stemmed from the fact that
the public interest requirement actually disserved the purposes of the CPA because it actually made
recovery more difficult. Rowland, supra note 6, at 688. In addition, a public interest requirement
seemed an impractical requirement for a statute conferring private causes of action for individuals
seeking compensatory damages, rather than large public agencies that were more likely to see
injunctive relief. For other law review articles discussing the public interest requirement see David J.
Dove, Washington Consumer Protection Act - Public Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 201 (1984); Susan K. Storey, Note, On the Propriety of the Public Interest Requirement in the
Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143 (1986); Rowland, supra
note 6 at 673; Carol S. Gown, Private Suits Under Washington Consumer Protection Act: Public
Interest Requirement, 54 WASH. L. REV. 795 (1979).
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public interest requirement has diminished in light of the development of
the law of unfair or deceptive acts. Specifically, the manner in which
courts interpret what constitutes an unfair or deceptive act has, to a large
degree, subsumed the independent legal significance of the public
interest requirement, rendering it a duplicative and time-consuming
element that should no longer be necessary to bring a private cause of
action. In practical terms, the standard for unfair or deceptive acts in
Washington largely dispenses with the need for a separate inquiry into
whether the public interest element has been satisfied. Ultimately, either
the Washington Supreme Court or the Washington Legislature should
eliminate the public interest requirement as a threshold condition
necessary to bring a private cause of action under the Washington CPA.
This Article explores the application of the public interest
requirement since the decision in Hangman Ridge and considers whether
the tests devised by the Hangman Ridge court to determine public
interest are still necessary in light of current interpretations of what
constitutes an unfair or deceptive act. Part II provides general
background information regarding the development of consumer
protection laws in Washington leading up to the Hangman Ridge
decision. Part III discusses the Hangman Ridge decision. Finally, Part IV
argues, through representative cases, statutory language, and a
comparison with other jurisdictions, that unfair or deceptive acts are
misconduct that necessarily touches the public interest, and that the
public interest requirement no longer retains any independent legal
significance.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE PRIVATE LAW OF CONSUMER RIGHTS
The evolution of the private law of consumer rights necessarily
begins with a discussion of the rise and fall of the doctrine of caveat
emptor as well as a brief recounting of the formation of the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"). This section will then examine the state of
consumer protection law in Washington prior to the Hangman Ridge
decision and how this backdrop shaped the court's decision.
A. From the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
to the Federal Trade Commission
Before commissions, statutes, and attorney's fees, the earliest
consumer protection for civil wrongs was found in the non-statutory
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body of commercial tort law. 8 An injured party had to show that a
merchant had breached some duty owed to the plaintiff, and that this
breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer injury.9 One of
the products of this strict form of commercial law was the doctrine of
caveat emptor.' 0 Originally applied to the transfer of real property, the
doctrine of caveat emptor required buyers to "fend for themselves"
because it was assumed that sellers and purchasers occupied equal
bargaining positions and shared an equal opportunity to inspect the
quality of the property and to discover defective conditions before the
transfer of title occurred."
Caveat emptor was a substantial obstacle to judicial recourse if a
consumer discovered defects after the transaction. The combined effect
of burdens of proof and sellers' defenses virtually eliminated effective
enforcement of a consumer's rights through an action in tort for deceit.' 2
Buyers faced the high burden of proving that the seller has intentionally
misrepresented a material fact, and sellers defended on the grounds that
they had engaged in "mere puffery."' 3 Moreover, an action for breach of
a common law warranty was often foreclosed by lack of contractual
privity."
Caveat emptor survived in this country well into the middle of the
twentieth century, but changing market forces and new movements to
protect the consumer ultimately spelled its demise.' 5 The rapid
development of a complex, ever-expanding market of goods meant that
an unregulated market could no longer deliver economically efficient
8. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO RCW 19.86: THE WASHINGTON
UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES -CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2 (1970).
9. Id.
10. Id. The English common law first adopted the doctrine of caveat emptor in the celebrated
case of Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 Eng. Rep. 3, Cro. Jac. 4 (Ex. Ch. 1603).
11. Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed? - Doubting the Demise of Caveat
Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV 387, 390 (1996). At the time, it was believed these assumptions were
justified because improvements to products were generally non-complex, and discerning buyers
were capable of investigating the quality of the goods for themselves. These were truly arms-length
transactions. Id. at 392.
12. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR, supra note 8, at 3.
13. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR, supra note 8, at 3.
14. Thomas J. Holdych, A Seller's Responsibilities to Remote Purchasers for Breach of
Warranty in the Sales of Goods Under Washington Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 239, 240-41
(2005).
15. For an account of the replacement of caveat emptor in sales law with warranties, see
generally Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699, 737-44
(1936). The evolution away from caveat emptor has been most dramatic in the context of residential
real estate. See generally George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How The Real
Estate Industry Eased The Transition From Caveat Emptor To "Seller Tell All, " 39 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 193 (2004).
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outcomes.' 6 Products were no longer the sole factor to consider in
evaluating quality; goods could easily be differentiated through
advertising, packaging, and other "tricks of contemporary
merchandising" that amounted to a deluge of information that consumers
could no longer be expected to evaluate reasonably in making optimal
decisions. 17
The development of the law of deceptive trade practices is also an
important step on the road towards private causes of action for
consumers. Perhaps the most widely recognized authority in this area is
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission"), one of the
oldest regulatory agencies in the United States, which was established by
the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.18 Although originally
intended to regulate trade and monopolistic business practices, a 1938
amendment to the Act gave the Commission broad authority to prohibit"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in or affecting commerce, thus
cementing the Commission's authority over consumer-related issues. 19
While the Commission's authority appears plenary, there is one
important jurisdictional obstacle to a Commission action. The FTC Act
states that the Commission shall issue a complaint whenever it has
reason to believe that an unfair or deceptive trade practice has been
committed, and "if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding..
• would be to the interest of the public., 20 The nature of this limitation
was first explored in the Supreme Court decision FTC v. Klesner,21 in
which the Court held that the scope of the FTC's authority is "strictly
16. Babette B. Barton, Private Recourse for Consumers: Redress or Rape?, in PROTECTING
CONSUMER INTERESTS: PRIVATE INITIATIVE AND PUBLIC RESPONSE 183, 184 (Robert N. Katz ed.,
1976).
17. Richard J. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L. REV 1203, 1226 (1966).
Other factors that distinguished the market in the 1960s from previous years included the flood of
new technologically advanced products, the alleged power of corporations to exert unprecedented
control over the market, the difficulties associated with buying with freely available credit, and the
plight of the consumer left out of mainstream affluence. See also CONSUMER PROTECTION 140
(Lester A. Sobel et al. eds., 1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58; see generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER
PROTECTION HANDBOOK 37-39 (2004).
19. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. Ill (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l)). The
Commission had, for many years prior, issued cease and desist orders against the practice of
deceiving consumers, recognizing this as an unfair method of competition and within the purview of
the commission. The FTC faced a setback, however, in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931),
in which the Supreme Court refused to find that a seller's failure to reveal certain safety hazards in
advertisements for an obesity cure constituted "unfair competition." It should also be noted that the
provisions of the FTC Act were primarily intended to abolish the doctrine of caveat emptor. See
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR, supra note 8, at 15.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1992).
21. 280 U.S. 19(1929).
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limited" by the public interest requirement, that the public interest must
be "specific and substantial," and that the Commission's determination
that a proceeding met the public interest prerequisite was subject to
judicial review. 22 This brief history of the modernization of consumer
protection law evinces a unique spirit of empowerment which overrode
the doctrine of caveat emptor. In no uncertain terms, the trend has been
towards greater consumer protection, and is thus a relevant and necessary
backdrop for the discussion of the public interest element in Washington.
B. Consumer Protection Law in Washington before Hangman Ridge
Sharing the concerns of the federal government, many states'
authorities also began the process of passing new laws and amending old
ones to enhance the position of consumers. In 1961, in direct response to
the growing inadequacy of existing state laws and remedies, the
Washington Legislature passed an act similar to the FTC Act, which
permitted the Attorney General to seek redress for unfair or deceptive
trade practices. 23 In 1970, the CPA was amended to create a private
cause of action for individuals under the Act. 4 Under the new language,
there were four elements: (1) The defendant must have committed an
unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the act or practice must have
occurred "in the conduct of any trade or commerce"; (3) the plaintiff
must have suffered injury to his "business or property"; and (4) a causal
relationship must exist between the defendant's act or practice and the
plaintiffs injury.25
The law that developed subsequent to this amendment, however,
became incongruous and conflicting. Rather than following the language
of the statute, Washington courts devised an entirely different approach
to private causes of action.26 Litigants wishing to bring a private cause of
action could proceed by one of two alternate methods.
22. Id. at 27-30; see also DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 548 (2003)
(discussing Klesner).
23. See 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1956; see also NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR, supra note 8, at
14. In a report to Governor Albert D. Rosellini in 1960, then Attorney General John J. O'Connell
and a special consumer advisory council noted rampant escalation in consumer protection concerns
in five areas: false advertising, home improvement, retail installment sales, restraints of trade, and
automobile sales. WASHINGTON CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR ALBERT D. ROSELLINI, 5 (1960).
24. See 1970 Wash. Sess. Laws 202 (codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (West,
WESTLAW through 2005 legislation)).
25. Rowland, supra note 6, at 675.
26. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also supra note 6.
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First, a CPA claim could be based on deceptive practices that were
unregulated by statute but involved the public interest.27 Such violations
for unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce were
governed by the holding in Ahnold v. Daniels.28 In Ahnold, the
Washington Supreme Court held that, in order for an individual to bring
an action under Washington's private causes of action statute, the
conduct complained of must (1) be unfair or deceptive, (2) be within the
sphere of trade or commerce, and (3) impact the public interest.2 9
Regarding the public interest element, the Ahnold court repealed the
earlier holding in Lightfoot, in which the court held that in order for
conduct to affect the public interest it must be "vulnerable to a complaint
by the Attorney General., 30 The Ahnold court rejected this rule, holding
that it was too restrictive and too all-inclusive.3' It was too restrictive
because it limited causes of action to the most egregious cases which the
Attorney General would otherwise pursue. It was too all-inclusive
because it could potentially encompass so many cases that the Act would
become a remedy for virtually all private wrongs.32 Departing from
Lightfoot, the Ahnold court refined the public interest inquiry into a
three-part test, holding that an impact on the public interest is
demonstrated when the proof establishes that:
(1) the defendant, by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce, has induced the plaintiff to act or refrain
from acting;
(2) the plaintiff suffers damage brought about by such action or
failure to act; and
(3) the defendant's deceptive acts have the potential for
repetition. 33
27. See Ahnold v. Daniels, 94 Wash. 2d 40, 45-46, 614 P.2d 184, 188 (1980) (discussing
private causes of action under the CPA). These types of violations have also been referred to as "de
facto violations."
28.94 Wash. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980).
29. Id. at 45, 614 P.2d at 188. This was an apparent aberration from the plain language of the
statute. See supra text accompanying note 6.
30. Ahnold, 94 Wash. 2d at 45, 614 P.2d at 188. The Ahnold court also noted that the
"'Attorney General' test for sufficiency of public interest appears to have been little utilized or
understood and has yielded conflicting results." Id. at 43, 614 P.2d at 186 (citing to Testo v. Russ
Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 52, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 46, 614 P.2d at 188.
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Second, a CPA claim could be based on what courts generally
referred to as a "per se violation." The Washington Supreme Court first
expounded on the per se method in State v. Reader's Digest
Association,34 in which the court held that an act which (1) violated
another statute and (2) was against public policy was a "per se unfair
trade practice" within the meaning of the CPA.35 Six years later, in Salois
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,36 the court elaborated on the public policy
element in the Reader 's Digest opinion by holding that the violation of a
statute containing language regarding the public interest constituted a
violation of public policy under the Reader's Digest test and a "per se
violation" of the CPA.37 In addition, the court held that either the
legislature or the judiciary could declare that the violation of a given
statute was against public policy. 38 Thus, after Salois, the violation of a
statute which stated that it was in the public interest, rather than one
stating its violation was an unfair or deceptive act, could also constitute a
per se unfair trade practice.39 In so holding, the Salois court implicitly
equated the Reader's Digest public policy requirement for per se
violations with the public interest requirement contained in the Ahnold
test.40
Adding to the confusion, the Washington Supreme Court
subsequently introduced two additional uses for the term "per se." First,
in Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemicals,41 the court held that in order to
satisfy the per se public interest impact requirement, the legislature had
to specifically declare the public interest of a violated statute.42 Second,
in McRae v. Bolstad,4 3 the court used per se in a third manner by
34. 81 Wash. 2d 259, 270, 501 P.2d 290, 298 (1972).
35. Id.
36. 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
37. Id. at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351 (concluding that the defendant's actions were a "per se
violation" of WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation)).
38. Id. at 358, 581 P.2d at 1351 (citing language in Reader's Digest Ass'n.,81 Wash. 2d 259,
501 P.2d 290). As many commentators have noted, the development of the public interest
requirement in per se violations was marred by overlapping terms and tests which provided part of
the impetus for the Hangman Ridge decision. See also Susan C. Lybeck, New Consumer Protection
Private Action Test: Clarification or Further Confusion?-Hangman Ridge Training Stables v.
Safeco Title Insurance Co, 62 WASH. L. REV. 277, 279-281 (1986) (discussing per se violations).
The discussion in this Article focuses primarily on the public interest requirement in deceptive
practices unregulated by statute, but will address to some degree legislative declarations of public
interest impact which permits individuals to allege per se violations.
39. Lybeck, supra note 38, at 280.
40. Lybeck, supra note 38, at 280.
41.97 Wash. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
42. Id. at 762, 649 P.2d at 833.
43. 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984).
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referring to findings of unfair trade practices as "per se violations" of the
44CPA. By the end of this line of cases, a private cause of action based on
a per se violation arose in three different contexts: (1) per se unfair trade
practices; (2) per se public interest impact; and (3) per se violations. 45
The Washington Court of Appeals also devised its own test for
determining whether a plaintiff had successfully alleged a per se
violation.46 Under this test, plaintiffs had to prove: (1) the existence of a
pertinent statute; (2) its violation; (3) that such violation was the
proximate cause of damages sustained; and (4) that they were within the
class of people the statute sought to protect. 47
The relationship between the Ahnold deceptive practices test and
the various per se formulations contributed to a substantial lack of clarity
in the law of private actions under the CPA. The court's contradictory
holdings precluded the establishment of a clear definition of the public
interest test which could standardize the determination of what precisely
would constitute public interest in a given case. Without clear guidance
as to the relationship between the Ahnold deceptive practices test and the
other per se tests, courts did not have a uniform set of guidelines to
determine precisely what was necessary to bring a private cause of
action, which lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results. 48 This was
the state of the law of private rights under the CPA prior to the Hangman
Ridge decision.
III. HANGMAN RIDGE TRAINING STABLES V. SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE
In Hangman Ridge, the Washington Supreme Court responded to
the unsettled state of the law of private causes of action by establishing a
new test for litigants seeking to bring a private cause of action under
Washington's CPA and by substantially revising the public interest
element. The decision's primary purpose, to provide litigants and courts
with guidelines for structured analysis of private causes of action, has
largely been borne out.4 9 This section first summarizes the facts of
44. Id. at 165-166, 676 P.2d at 499-500; see also Lybeck, supra note 38.
45. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 792, 719
P.2d 531, 538-39 (1986).
46. Dempsey v. Joe Pignataro Chevrolet, Inc., 22 Wash. App. 384, 589 P.2d 1265 (1979).
47. Id. at 393, 589 P.2d at 1269.
48. As commentators have pointed out, the similar and overlapping terminology in CPA
decisions often made it very difficult for practitioners to determine whether a case involved a per se
unfair trade practice or per se public interest impact, or involved an unfair or deceptive act
unregulated by statute, such as in Ahnold. Rowland, supra note 6, at 691.
49. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 792, 719 P.2d at 538-39. Most, if not all cases
interpreting CPA claims cite to Hangman Ridge and its discussion regarding the public interest
element, though there has been at least one case since the Hangman Ridge decision which appears to
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Hangman Ridge. It then discusses the elements of the five-part test the
court formulated, and concludes with a discussion of the public interest
element under the five-part test.
A. The Facts of Hangman Ridge
The dispute in Hangman Ridge arose when the plaintiffs, sole
shareholders in the Hangman Ridge Training Stables Corporation,
applied for a loan to ease financial pressures that resulted from their
failure to file individual and corporate tax returns for several years. 50 As
a condition of the loan, the plaintiffs were required to give a security
interest in real estate that their corporation was purchasing and to transfer
title of the property to themselves individually. 51 Safeco Title Insurance
Company ("Safeco"), the designated escrow closer, prepared a quitclaim
deed for the conveyance from Hangman Ridge to the plaintiffs.5 2 At the
closing, Safeco's agent informed the plaintiffs that she was not an
attorney, but provided no information regarding the need to consult
independent counsel to obtain tax advice regarding the conveyance.53
One year after closing, the plaintiffs learned that they had incurred
$3500 in tax liability resulting from the transfer of the deed.54 Believing
this tax liability could have been prevented if Safeco's agent had
informed them of the potential tax consequences, they brought suit
against Safeco, alleging that the loan closing and deed preparation
constituted the unauthorized practice of law and that such conduct
supported both a CPA and legal malpractice claim.55
B. The Analysis in Hangman Ridge
This setting was the groundwork for the Washington State Supreme
Court's redefinition of private causes of action in Washington. Noting
the irregular developments of different standards in the lower appellate
56 5courts, and its own misinterpretation of the statutory language,57 the
have omitted a discussion of the public interest element entirely. See, e.g., Evergreen Collectors v.
Holt, 50 Wash. App. 151, 154-55, 803 P.2d 10, 12 (1991). This is likely an isolated case, however.






56. Id. at 784, 719 P.2d at 535 ("Since the Lightfoot decision, the confusion surrounding the
private rights of action under the CPA has steadily increased.").
57. Id. As noted earlier, prior to Hangman Ridge, there were at least three different tests
formulated for private causes of action in Washington. See discussion supra Part I.B; see supra text
accompanying note 6.
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court adopted a five-part test for bringing private causes of action that
replaced all previous articulations of the appropriate standard:
To prevail in a private CPA action and therefore be entitled to
attorneys fees, a plaintiff must establish five distinct elements: (1)
unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce;
(3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her business or
property; and (5) causation.5
The Hangman Ridge decision provided a detailed explanation of
each of these elements.59 Regarding the first element, an unfair or
deceptive act or practice, the court reaffirmed that the proper inquiry was
not whether the act in question was intended to deceive, but whether the
alleged act had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the
public. 60 Regarding the second element, occurring in trade or commerce,
the court accepted the legislature's broad definition of "trade" and
"commerce" that included "the sale of assets or services, and any
commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of
Washington." 6 ' The court provided two methods by which these
elements could be satisfied: (1) by showing an act or practice that has the
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public has occurred in the
conduct of trade or commerce, 62 or, alternatively, (2) by showing that the
alleged act has constituted a "per se unfair trade practice."
63
The most significant departure from the previous legal framework
came in the court's reformulation of the public interest requirement. The
court noted that while forty-two states allow a private right of action,
only six of them have required a public interest showing.64 The court also
acknowledged the general criticism various commentators and others had
voiced regarding the insistence on a public interest requirement.
65
However, the court declined to dispense with the public interest
58. Id. at 784-85, 719 P.2d 531, 535. As used throughout this article, the phrase "the first
prong" refers to whether an act is an unfair or deceptive practice, and the phrase "the third prong"
refers to the public interest requirement.
59. Id
60. Id. at 785, 719 P.2d at 535.
61. Id. ("The CPA . . . bring[s] within its reaches every person who conducts unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in any trade or commerce.").
62. Id.
63. Id. at 786, 719 P.2d at 535. The court was very specific as to how a per se unfair trade
practice may be shown. Only in cases where the legislature has specifically declared the violation of
a statute to constitute "an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce," or "unfair trade practices,"
will the court deem an alleged violation a per se unfair trade practice under the statute. Id.
64. Id. at 787, 719 P.2d at 536 ("Of [the 42 states allowing a private right of action] only 6
have ever required a public interest showing of a private plaintiff under any circumstances.").
65. Id. at 788.
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requirement for two reasons. First, it noted that maintaining a public
interest requirement was consistent with the purpose section of the
CPA.66 Construing the statute as a whole, the court concluded that,
although it does not specifically mention public interest, the Legislature
nevertheless intended that "even a private plaintiff should be required to
show that the acts complained of affect the public interest., 67 Second, the
court noted that in the ten years since it first construed the CPA to
require a public interest showing in Lightfoot, the legislature had taken
no action to eliminate such a requirement, which indicated legislative
approval of the public interest requirement.68
In addition to reaffirming the necessity of the requirement, the court
redefined the methods by which a plaintiff could demonstrate a public
interest impact.69 In order to determine whether an unfair or deceptive act
affected the public interest, the court stated it is first necessary to
determine whether the underlying transaction more closely resembled a
consumer transaction or a private dispute.70 Where the underlying
transaction is more aptly characterized as a consumer transaction, the
court listed five factors for consideration:
(1) whether the alleged acts were committed in the course of
defendant's business;
(2) whether the acts are part of a pattern or generalized course of
conduct;
66. The purpose section of WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation) states in full the following:
The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this Act is to complement the body of
federal law governing restraints on trade, unfair competition, and unfair, deceptive, and
fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest
competition. It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing this Act, the courts be
guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final orders of the federal trade
commission interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar
matters and that in deciding whether conduct restrains or monopolizes trade or commerce
or may substantially lessen competition, determination of the relevant market or effective
area of competition shall not be limited by the boundaries of the state of Washington. To
this end this act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served.
It is, however, the intent of the legislature that this Act shall not be construed to prohibit
acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of
business or which are not injurious to the public interest, or to be construed to authorize
those acts or practices which unreasonably restrain trade or are unreasonable per se.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation).
67. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 788, 719 P.2d at 537.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 789-90, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
70. Id
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(3) whether repeated acts were committed prior to the act involving
the plaintiff;
(4) whether there is a real and substantial potential for repetition of
defendant's conduct after the act involving the plaintiff; and
(5) if the act complained of involved a single transaction, whether
many consumers were affected or were likely to be affected by it.71
On the other hand, when the underlying transaction essentially
constitutes a private dispute, the likelihood that additional plaintiffs have
been or will be injured in exactly the same fashion is sufficient to change
a private dispute into one that affects the public interest. 72 In this case,
the relevant factors to consider are the following:
(1) whether the alleged acts were committed in the course of
defendant's business;
(2) whether the defendant advertised to the public in general;
(3) whether the defendant actively solicited this particular plaintiff;
and
(4) whether the plaintiff and defendant occupied unequal
bargaining positions.7
3
In addition to establishing public interest impact through these
multi-factor tests, the court held that public interest may be satisfied per
se, by pointing to the violation of a statute which contains a specific
legislative declaration of a public interest impact.74
Hangman Ridge was a much-needed substantial clarification of
what litigants must show in order to bring a private cause of action under
the CPA. While it was initially subject to some criticism, 75 it has
71. Id. at 790, 719 P.2d at 538.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 538.
74. Id. The Hangman Ridge court specifically addressed the various iterations of "per se" that
had evolved over the years. See discussion supra Part I.B; see supra text accompanying note 6. The
court noted that the term "per se" is imprecise and "should be replaced by 'per se public interest' or
'per se unfair trade practice,' thus eliminating the phrase 'per se violations"'. Hangman Ridge, 105
Wash. 2d at 792, 719 P.2d at 538-39. The "per se violation" phrase, however, has seen a slow
removal from the CPA lexicon. See generally Anderson v. Valley Quality Homes, Inc., 84 Wash.
App. 511,928 P.2d 1143 (1997).
75. See Lybeck, supra note 38, at 287. Lybeck points out that the court (1) did not draw
adequate distinctions between consumer transactions and private disputes, (2) failed to assign weight
to the various factors that are used to determine whether a dispute is a consumer transaction or a
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remained unmodified in the eighteen years since its inception. However,
though the Hangman decision indisputably brought a necessary curative
effect in an area of law that had been marred by a lack of uniformity,
because that lack of uniformity no longer plagues the law of private
causes of action, we are now in a position to evaluate the necessity of the
public interest requirement in light of the development of the law of
unfair or deceptive acts. Specifically, given the manner in which
Washington courts define an unfair or deceptive act, the primary
justifications for the public interest element upon which the Hangman
Ridge decision relied are no longer controlling, and abandonment of the
public interest requirement is entirely justifiable.76
IV. THE SUBSUMPTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIREMENT
77
The following section presents four primary arguments to support
the contention that the independent legal significance of the public
interest requirement has been severely diminished since the Hangman
Ridge decision: (1) unfair or deceptive acts necessarily affect the public
interest; (2) acts that are "unfair" necessarily affect the public interest;
(3) the capacity to deceive test serves as an adequate barrier to frivolous
CPA claims; and (4) equating unfair or deceptive acts with acts that have
the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public is consistent
with the language of the CPA.
private dispute, and (3) did not address language in other statutes that reference the CPA as a whole,
rather than unfair or deceptive practices, or public interest impact alone.
76. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D.
77. At one end of the spectrum, the law strives to create multi-pronged tests with distinct
elements that, in theory, upon application to fact, yield the correct result; Hangman Ridge can be
viewed as creating this type of situation. On the other end, there are cases where distinct multi-prong
approaches to questions of fact do not lend themselves to the type of nuanced and delicate approach
that certain determinations may require. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983)
(rejecting "rigid" two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause determinations in favor of a
"totality of the circumstances" inquiry). Between these two extremes lies the present case, where
there are elements that can be distinguished in certain circumstances, but practically speaking, it
serves no purpose to draw these distinctions. A good example of a typical "subsumption" debate can
be seen in the opinions regarding whether, under the Delaware General Corporations Law, there is a
duty of "good faith" that is analytically separate from the duty of loyalty. Compare Orman v.
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (arguing the duty of good faith is subsumed within the
duty of loyalty) with McMullin .v Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000) (insisting the duty of good
faith is a separate duty).
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A. Unfair or Deceptive Acts Necessarily Affect the Public Interest
Because the Capacity-to-Deceive Test Equates Unfair or Deceptive Acts
to En-Masse Repetition of Harmful Conduct
An act that is defined as "unfair or deceptive" necessarily affects
the public interest because an unfair or deceptive act in Washington must
exhibit the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. As a
result of this formulation, the analysis a court must employ to determine
whether a defendant's acts were unfair or deceptive is essentially
identical to that required to determine whether the public interest
requirement has been met. Necessarily, then, the independent legal
significance of the public interest requirement is significantly diminished
under this formulation of an unfair or deceptive act.
The same year the court in Lightfoot v. MacDonald construed the
private remedy statute to require a showing of public interest,78
Washington courts adopted a new interpretation of an unfair or deceptive
act from federal courts interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 79 For conduct to
be unfair or deceptive, a plaintiff need not show that the act in question
was intended to deceive, but only that the alleged act had the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public. 80 This comports with FTC
decisions regarding deceptive practices that allow the FTC to enforce its
consumer protection mandate under a strict liability regime. 8' The
reasons underlying this lack of scienter requirement reflect the
assumption that any unfair or deceptive act that misleads should be
stopped, regardless of the intent of the perpetrator. 82 Whether a plaintiff
78.86 Wash. 2d 331, 334, 544 P.2d 88, 90 (1976).
79. This is the codification of the FTC Act, and specifically provides that "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Washington's unfair or deceptive trade practices statute is
modeled from this provision. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. In addition, the Legislature
has provided that courts are to be instructed by final decisions of the federal courts. See supra note
66.
80. See Fisher v. World-Wide Trophy Outfitters, 15 Wash. App. 742, 748, 551 P.2d 1398,
1403 (1976) (citing Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1961)). Under the FTC
formulation, a practice is unlawful merely for being likely to mislead consumers. Letter from James
C. Miller I1l, FTC Chairman, to John D. Dingell, Chair of House Comm. On Energy & Commerce
(Oct. 14, 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. These standards are
essentially the same.
81. Most consumer protection statutes do not include a scienter element. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) (West, WESTLAW through 2005) (no mention of scienter requirement); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.020 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (same). Thus, the FTC and state
enforcement agencies enforce these consumer protection statutes under what is essentially a strict
liability regime. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, supra note 18, at 4.
82. See Brandt Consol., Inc. v. Agrimar Corp., 801 F. Supp. 164, 174 (C.D. I11. 1992).
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has actually been deceived is irrelevant; 83 the purpose of the capacity to
deceive test is to deter deceptive conduct before injury occurs.84
Therefore, implicit in this test is a command that the court consider the
seller's conduct not only as it affected the plaintiff in one particular case,
but also as it affected individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff.85
The capacity to deceive test addresses those same concerns that the
legislature intended the public interest requirement to address. 86 When a
party has engaged in deceptive conduct that has the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public, this necessarily speaks to the possibility
of repetition of that unfair or deceptive conduct. The relevant factors in
determining if there is a public interest impact essentially constitutes an
inquiry into whether deceptive conduct has been repeated, or exhibits the
possibility of repetition.87 Thus, conduct exhibiting the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public necessarily subsumes the
public interest requirement because the conduct entails en-masse
repetition of unfair or deceptive acts; a court therefore acts in the public
interest when it awards damages as a result of that conduct. 88 Although
the Hangman Ridge court never explicitly equated these elements with
one another, the opinion can be interpreted to that effect.89
83. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 51, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976).
84. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 785, 719
P.2d 531, 535 (1986).
85. This does not mean, of course, that plaintiffs can bring private causes of action under the
CPA on behalf of others. The statute still requires that a plaintiff sustain damage to "his or her
business or property." WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation).
86. If the acts are part of a generalized course of conduct, if there is a real and substantial
potential for repetition, and if many consumers were affected or likely to be affected by the seller's
misconduct, courts are more likely to find that the public interest requirement has been met in a
consumer transaction. In private disputes, the likelihood that plaintiffs would be injured in exactly
the same fashion would constitute public interest. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at
538 (emphasis added). Courts continually return to the possibility of repetition as indicia of public
interest impact. See discussion Part W.A. I and cases cited therein.
87. See Nancy E. Brasel, Ad Hoc Deceptions In Private Disputes: When Does a Private
Plaintiff Confer A Public Interest Under Minnesota's Private Attorney General Statute?, 29 WM.
MITCHELL. L. REV. 321, 336-37 (2002) (discussing Hangman Ridge).
88. See Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 785, 719 P.2d at 535 (citing Haner v. Quincy Farm
Chems., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 753, 759, 649 P.2d 828, 831 (1982)).
89. For example, in discussing the public interest requirement with respect to private
transactions, the court noted, "it is the likelihood that additional plaintiffs have been or will be
injured in exactly the same fashion that changes a factual pattern from a private dispute to one that
affects the public interest." Id. at 790, 719 P.2d at 538 (emphasis added). In addition, the court also
noted that a relevant inquiry in cases of single transactions is whether many consumers were affected
or likely to be affected. Id. Among the relevant factors to establish public interest in a consumer
transaction is whether there is a real and substantial potential for repetition of defendant's conduct
after the act involving the plaintiff. See id.
2005] Public Interest Requirement under Washington 's CPA 221
As an example of how the capacity to deceive test subsumes the
public interest requirement, consider a standard form contract. Courts
have suggested that use of a standard form contract containing fraudulent
terms could constitute an unfair or deceptive act.90 Because a seller will
reuse a form contract in each of its dealings with members of the public
as a standard business practice, each use would essentially lead to the
same deception. Inherent in the use of form contracts is the potential for
repetition, because every time someone engages in business with that
seller, they will be deceived by a contract with fraudulent terms. The
same holds true for false advertising; if the false advertising is permitted
to continue undeterred, members of the public will continue to be
deceived by it. It is the en-masse repetition of deceptive conduct which
vitally affects the public interest. 91
90. Henery v. Robinson, 67 Wash. App. 277, 291, 834 P.2d 1091, 1098 (1992), review denied,
120 Wash. 2d 1024, 844 P.2d 1018 (1993).
91. Further support for this is found in Potter v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 62 Wash. App. 318, 327-28,
814 P.2d 670, 674-75 (1991). In Potter, the issue on appeal was whether the trial court had erred in
dismissing the plaintiffs' claim that because the defendant had made only one misrepresentation to
the plaintiff, they had failed to show that the seller's conduct had the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public. The court of appeals reversed, noting that although in some cases,
particularly in sales presentations, misrepresentations may only be heard by one party, a seller's
representations are not intended to make sales to only one customer; it is the fact that they "[have]
the capacity to effect a multitude of customers that is dispositive." Id. (emphasis added). It is the
subsequent communication of misrepresentation to other potential buyers that this element prohibits.
These are considerations very much geared towards the public interest. See also Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Whiteman Tire, Inc., 86 Wash. App. 732, 744-45, 935 P.2d 628, 635 (1997) (noting
that in regards to unfair or deceptive acts, the acts must have the capacity to deceive a substantial
portion of the public, and that in regards to the public interest requirement, there must be a
likelihood that additional persons have or will be injured in the same fashion) (emphasis added);
Evergreen Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co., 52 Wash. App. 548, 761 P.2d 964 (1988) (relying on WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.30.010 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) which states that "[t]he
business of insurance is one affected by the public interest" and WASH. ADMIN. CODE §284-30-
330(6) (West, WESTLAW through 2005 amendments), providing that "[n]ot attempting in good
faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims" constitutes an unfair trade
practice, to hold insurer liable for insured's property damages). In addition, there are a number of
statutes the violation of which constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice in trade or commerce, and
that the Legislature has declared as vitally affecting the public interest. Some of these include the
following: WASH. REV. CODE § 9.35.040 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (identity
crimes), § 15.04.410 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (restrictions on "Washington
State Grown"), § 18.11.260 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (auctioneers), § 18.27.350
(West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (registration of contractors), § 18.44.450 (West,
WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (referral fees under the Escrow Agent Registration Act), §
19.56.030 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (unsolicited goods), § 19.138.290 (West,
WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (sellers of travel), § 19.146.100 (West, WESTLAW through
2005 legislation) (Mortgage Broker Practices Act), § 19.154.090 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation) (Immigration Assistant Practices Act), § 19.160.020 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation) (business telephone listings), § 19.162.010 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation)) (pay-per-call information delivery services), § 19.166.100 (West, WESTLAW through
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1. Early Cases Applying the Five-Part Hangman Ridge Test
Demonstrate the Inherent Similarity between the Capacity to
Deceive Test and the Public Interest Requirement.
In many early cases applying the new Hangman Ridge five-part
test, the analysis of the unfair or deceptive act element was substantially
identical to that of the public interest requirement. 92 These cases suggest
that some courts have, indeed, come to view conduct that has the
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public as exhibiting the
potential for repetition that the public interest requirement is designed to
prevent. For example, in Nordstrom Inc., v. Tampourlos, Tampourlos, a
beauty salon owner, had been operating beauty salons in four of
Nordstrom's stores. 93 Nordstrom decided to relocate one of these stores
and did not wish to continue its salon operation in the new location.94
Tampourlos decided to open his own salon under the name "Nostrum"
and used the same typeface as the Nordstrom logo.95 Nordstrom brought
suit for trade name infringement and unfair competition, alleging a
violation of the CPA.96 Nordstrom was initially awarded an injunction on
the use of Nordstrom's logo, and another trial was held the following
year to determine whether the use of the name "Nostrum" constituted a
trade name infringement and was an unfair method of competition. 9 The
trial court found that there was a trade name infringement and enjoined
Tampourlos from using it in connection with his salon.98 On appeal,
however, the Court of Appeals vacated the award on the grounds that
there had not been a proper showing of public interest and, therefore, the
CPA had not been violated.99
The Washington Supreme Court accepted review, writing an
opinion that exemplifies the blending of the first and third elements of
2005 legislation) (international student exchange), § 19.170.010 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation) (promotional advertising of prizes), § 19.178.110 (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation) (going out of business sales), § 19.182.150 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation)
(Fair Credit Reporting Act), § 19.186.050 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) (roofing and
siding contractors and salespersons), § 19.190.030 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation)
(commercial electronic mail), § 19.220.030 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation)
(international matchmaking organizations), § 26.33.400(3) (West, WESTLAW through 2005
legislation) (adoption).
92. See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wash. 2d 735, 733 P.2d 208 (1987);
Evergreen Int'l, Inc., 52 Wash. App. 548, 761 P.2d 964.
93. 107 Wash. 2d at 737, 733 P.2d at 209.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 737-38, 733 P.2d at 209.
97. Id. at 738, 733 P.2d at 209.
98. Id.
99. Id., 733 P.2d at 210.
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the Hangman Ridge five-part test. The court began its analysis by finding
that an action for trade name infringement met the first, second, fourth,
and fifth prongs of the test. °0 0 In regards to its determination that trade
name infringement was an unfair or deceptive act, it noted that "the
appropriation of Nordstrom's name tends to and does deceive or mislead
persons of ordinary caution into the belief that they are dealing with one
concern when in fact they are dealing with the other."10' 1 The Nordstrom
court also found that the public interest requirement had been met,
although it reached that result in a haphazard manner. The court
struggled with the determination of whether the underlying transaction
was more aptly characterized as a consumer dispute or a private dispute,
and, although it noted that no clear distinction was workable, it
ultimately found that the cause of action more closely resembled a
private dispute. 102 In holding the public interest requirement was met, the
court found that "the public was integrally involved" because the use of
the name "Nostrum tended to deceive and mislead persons of ordinary
caution that they were dealing with one concern when in fact they were
dealing with another." 103 This language is essentially identical to the
language the court used in determining whether the conduct was an
unfair or deceptive act. Thus, in Nordstrom, the dispositive factor for
satisfying both the unfair or deceptive act element as well as the public
interest element was whether there was a tendency for the act
complained of to deceive the public. 104
Another example of the capacity to deceive test subsuming the role
of the public interest requirement is found in Travis v. Washington Horse
Breeders Ass 'n.10 5 In Travis, the plaintiff purchased a colt for $25,000,
relying on statements from a sales agent that the horse was "a fine
athlete" and "in very good condition."' 0 6 Various advertisements
appearing both on television and in magazines had also characterized the
100. Id. at 739-40, 733. P.2d 210-11.
101. Id. at 740, 733 P.2d at 210.
102. Id. at 741-42, 733 P.2d at 211.
103. Idat 742, 733 P.2d at 211-12. The court also noted that "[a] necessary component of trade
name infringement is that the plaintiff must establish that the name used is likely to confuse the
public." Id. at 742-43, 733 P.2d at 212.
104. The court attempted to dispel any speculation that it had judicially created a per se
violation. It also seemed to have justified its public interest analysis, partially, on the necessity of the
plaintiff establishing that the name used is likely to confuse the public in order to prove trade name
infringement. It is conceivable that Nordstrom was an isolated case, distinguishable by the nature of
a trade name infringement cause of action; however, future cases do not bear out this proposition.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
105. 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d 418 (1988).
106. Id. at 399, 759 P.2d at 419.
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horse as "truly outstanding" and "bound to run. '1 7 A week after the sale,
medical examinations revealed that the horse had a heart murmur. l08 The
plaintiff immediately contacted the sellers and attempted to rescind the
sale,109 and eventually sued under the CPA.110
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Travis is noteworthy
for its consideration of the plaintiffs CPA claim. The court found,
contrary to the defendant's arguments, that the sale of the colt with a
heart murmur was an unfair or deceptive act because the sellers had
represented the colt as a horse in healthy condition, both to the plaintiff
individually and to the public at large, through its advertisements.' 1
Furthermore, the plaintiff had introduced evidence that it was not
common practice for the sellers to examine their horses, and as a result
many unsound horses had been sold to the public.'l 2
The court did not devote a significant amount of time to the public
interest element. After characterizing the transaction as a private dispute,
the court noted that all five of the relevant factors were present in the
case, particularly given that the seller's practices were longstanding and
had not changed. 1 3 Although the court did not elaborate on how these
elements were satisfied, its analysis appears to be based on the same
conclusions it reached when it addressed whether the seller's conduct
had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. 114 Thus,
the Travis court's analysis regarding the public interest element mirrored
the analysis in Nordstrom by treating the underlying facts that give rise
to an unfair or deceptive act exhibiting the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public as sufficient to give rise to the public
interest requirement.
107. Id. at 398, 759 P.2d at 419. According to the court, the seller did in fact use the language
"bound to run."
108. Id. Although many fit and healthy horses have heart murmurs, apparently the plaintiff in
Travis believed this was more than a temporary complication.
109. Id.
110. Id. The plaintiff also brought claims for breach of express warranty, implied warranty of
merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
111. Id. at 406, 759 P.2d at 423.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 407, 759 P.2d at 423. The court also noted that although the act involved a single
transaction, other consumers were likely to be affected by the purchase of a defective horse, such as
jockeys and the betting public.
114. After all, if the sellers were engaged in active advertising, there is certainly a real and
substantial potential for repetition because other consumers may be fooled by the fraudulent ads.
These would also represent acts committed prior to the act involving the present plaintiff. Both of
these conclusions are inferences one can easily draw from acts or practices that have the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public.
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2. Later Decisions have been More Explicit about the Inherent
Similarity between an Unfair or Deceptive Act and the
Public Interest Requirement
Later decisions have been more explicit in equating the capacity to
deceive test with the public interest requirement, and some courts have
even recognized a functional equivalence between the two elements."
5
The potential for substantial deception was also substantively
equated with repetition in Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. v. DeLaurenti Florists,
Inc. "6 In Sign-O-Lite Signs, the florist, in need of a new sign for her
floral shop, was solicited by the sign maker."1 7 The vendor informed her
that the total price for the sign, including installation, would be
$2,901.60."8 The florist subsequently entered into a contract with the
sign vendor for the installation of a new sign, believing that she would
only be responsible for the difference between the sale price and her
down payment."19 However, she later discovered that the document she
signed was an extended lease agreement, obligating her to pay $305 per
month for the rental of the sign, which totaled over $2 1,000.120 The sign
company never informed her of these terms, nor instructed her as to
precisely what she was signing.1 2' A collection suit was subsequently
initiated against the florist, and the florist counterclaimed, alleging fraud
and violation of the CPA.122
The Sign-O-Lite Signs court readily found that the seller's conduct
constituted an unfair or deceptive act that was poised to deceive a
substantial portion of the public because the buyer had been patently
misled as to the terms of the contract, and had entered into the agreement
in reliance on the seller's statements both before and during the
consummation of the transaction.' 23 In addition, because it was routine
business for the seller to make "cold calls" by soliciting business owners
in their own stores, and representing that it was in the sign business, the
court found the seller's style of soliciting business compelling evidence
115. See discussion supra Part V.A.
116.64 Wash. App. 553, 825 P.2d 714 (1992).
117. Id. at 556, 825 P.2d at 716.
118. Id.
119. Id at 557, 825 P.2d at 716-17.
120. Id. at 558, 825 P.2d at 717. The estimated value of the installed sign was $3,950. Id. at
558 n.3, 825 P.2d 717 n.3.
121. Id. at 557, 825 P.2d at 717.
122. Id. at 553, 825 P.2d at 714.
123. Id. at 561-62, 825 P.2d at 719.
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that the potential existed for a substantial portion of the public to be
deceived.12 4
Again, the court looked to the underlying facts giving rise to the
unfair or deceptive practices to satisfy the public interest element,
thereby giving it only cursory examination.'2 5 While acknowledging that
the dispute in question was more aptly characterized as a private
dispute,1 26 the court essentially treated the relevant factors as a whole and
broadly concluded that, given the method in which the seller solicited
business in the present case, there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that the defendant's conduct touched the public interest. 27 The Sign-O-
Lite Signs court thus considered the seller's style of soliciting business as
the primary consideration for whether it had engaged in unfair or
deceptive acts and whether those acts affected the public interest.' 2 8
Thus, in Sign-O-Lite Signs, once again, the seller's unfair or deceptive
act essentially acted as a proxy for public interest impact.
Although no court has gone so far as to explicitly equate the
capacity to deceive test with the public interest element, the court in
Hiner v. Bridgestone, Inc.129 stopped just short of this declaration by
recognizing that conduct constituting an unfair or deceptive act
necessarily affects the public interest.13 In Hiner, the plaintiff, who was
injured in a car accident after she slid into a truck on the highway,
brought suit against Bridgestone under the Product Liability Act.131 Her
claim alleged that Bridgestone had failed to warn that the snow tires
124. Id.
125. Id. at 562-63, 825 P.2d at 719-20.
126. Id. Although the court did not second guess its conclusion, it is at least open to argument
that the consumer transaction/private dispute distinction was not so easily satisfied in the present
case. Although the contract entailed a promise to render services, the plaintiff was essentially
bargaining to acquire a sign, which would characterize the transaction as a consumer transaction.
127. Id. The court also noted that in addition to the defendant's acknowledgment that it
routinely solicited other businesses, "the circumstances" in the case also supported a finding that the
public interest element had been met. The treatment of the public interest requirement is so minimal
in this case, this portion of the opinion can be reproduced here:
Sign acknowledges that its agent was acting in the course of Sign's business and actively
solicited DeLaurenti (criteria I and 3). Under the circumstances of this case and Sign's
own acknowledgment that it routinely solicits other businesses, the evidence here was
sufficient to show that Sign's acts or practices impact the public interest.
Id. at 562-63, 825 P.2d at 719-20. The court's refusal to elaborate further on the satisfaction of the
public interest factors is further indication that the analysis would essentially repeat what the court
had stated earlier in finding the defendant's conduct was unfair or deceptive.
128. Id.
129. 91 Wash. App. 722, 959 P.2d 1158 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 138 Wash. 2d 248,
978 P.2d 505 (1999).
130. Id. at 729, 959 P.2d at 1162.
131. WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.72 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation).
[Vol. 29:1
2005] Public Interest Requirement under Washington s CPA 227
would not provide adequate traction if installed only on the front wheel
axels. 132 (She later amended her complaint by adding claims for damages
to her business and property pursuant to the CPA).I 33 Although the court
did not discuss at length the plaintiffs CPA claim,1 34 in discussing the
five-part test for private causes of action the court noted that, "if the
failure to warn constitutes an unfair or deceptive act, it meets the public
interest element because many consumers were likely affected by it.' 135
The court's remark, although dicta, speaks volumes regarding the
connection between unfair or deceptive acts and the public interest. The
court indicated that if the act complained of was found to be unfair or
deceptive, it would necessarily meet the public interest, because the
failure to warn of a defect would affect a substantial portion of the
public. Though not necessary to its holding, this brief discussion of the
public interest element strongly suggests that litigants who successfully
show that a defendant's unfair or deceptive acts had the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public have also essentially made the
requisite public interest showing.
A recent Washington Court of Appeals decision also recognized the
inherent similarity between the unfair or deceptive practices element and
the public interest requirement.' 36 In Burbo, the court stated, in reference
to a CPA claim brought by a purchaser of real property after learning of
certain material defects on the property, "[t]he analysis of [the deceptive
practices and public interest element] is inherently circular."' 37 The court
also noted, in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the seller had actual knowledge of the defects in the property,
that "[i]f [the seller sold the property] with knowledge of the defect, then
both disputed elements of deceptive practice and public impact are
satisfied." 138 This case follows precisely the pattern demonstrated in the
Nordstrom, Travis, and Sign-O-Lite decisions which engaged in nearly
identical analyses with respect to the deceptive practices and public
132. Hiner, 91 Wash. App. at 726, 959 P.2d at 1161.
133. Id. at 727, 959 P.2d at 1161.
134. The court noted that the CPA does not cover actions for personal jury. Id at 728, 959 P.2d
at 1162 (citing Stevens v. Hyde Athletic Indus., Inc., 54 Wash. App. 366, 773 P.2d 871 (1989)).
135. Hiner, 91 Wash. App. at 729, 959 P.2d at 1162. The court ultimately went on to dismiss
the CPA claim because the plaintiff had failed to show that Bridgestone knew of the danger but
nevertheless misrepresented the safety of the snow tires, which would constitute a deceptive act for
purposes of the CPA. Id. at 730. Furthermore, the plaintiffs requested relief in the form of
reimbursement for lost wages, earning capacity, medical expenses, and damage to her car, arose
from personal injuries that were not recoverable under the Act. Id.
136. Burbo v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 125 Wash. App. 684, 106 P.3d 258 (2005).
137. Id. at 700, 106 P.3d at 266.
138. Id. at 700-01.
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interest elements, and further demonstrates the diminishing analytical
distinctions courts can adequately draw between these two similar
elements.
3. The Definition of the Public Interest Requirement in Other
Jurisdictions Suggests that the Capacity to Deceive Test and
the Public Interest Element are Functionally Equivalent
Jurisdictions outside of Washington State have also noted that the
determination of whether an unfair or deceptive act touches the public
interest is essentially an inquiry into the number of consumers who have
been or may be affected by the deceptive conduct.139
Washington has treaded a thin analytical line by separating unfair
acts that have a capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public
from the public interest element itself. The language used by other
jurisdictions with a judicially-imposed public interest element to define
public interest illustrates this fine distinction. For example, South
Carolina, like Washington, also requires plaintiffs to allege that a
defendant's actions adversely affected the public interest in order to
bring a private cause of action under the state's Unfair Trade Practices
Act. 140 It also explicitly states what constitutes public interest, 141 and has
expressly equated public interest impact with an unfair or deceptive
practice that has the potential for repetition.1 42 The potential for
repetition may be proved by showing that either (1) the same kind of
actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to
occur absent deterrence; or (2) the defendant's procedures created a
potential for repetition of the unfair and deceptive acts. 143 South
Carolina's formulations of the public interest element are thus grounded
on the premise that deceptive acts having the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public are treated as necessarily touching the
139. Brasel, supra note 88, at 337.
140. Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Comer Interiors, 351 S.E.2d 347 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (West, WESTLAW through 2004 Reg. Sess.) is similar to
Washington's private cause of action statute, and states: "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable
loss of money or property, real, or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person
of an unfair or deceptive methods, act or practice ... may bring an action individually ... to recover
actual damages."
141. South Carolina's public interest requirement is fashioned after, albeit in a modified form,
the Ahnold formulation of public interest. Compare text accompanying note 30, with Daisy Outdoor
Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 49 (S.C. 1996).
142. Crary v. Djebelli, 496 S.E.2d 21, 23 (S.C. 1998) (noting that an impact on the public
interest may be shown if the acts or practices have the potential for repetition).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
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public interest. 44 Notably, this language substantially mirrors the
language Washington courts use to describe the test for unfair or
deceptive acts that have the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of
the public.1 45 Therefore, an unfair or deceptive act that occurs in
Washington would be found necessarily to affect the public interest in
South Carolina. Thus, the fact that the tests for the public interest
element in South Carolina are nearly identical to Washington's capacity
to deceive test for unfair or deceptive practices suggests that an unfair or
deceptive act that has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the
public necessarily answers whether a cause of action affects the public
interest, rendering a separate inquiry into the public interest unnecessary
and duplicative.
Representing an even larger affront to the significance of the public
interest requirement in private causes of action, the public interest
requirement in FTC actions is no longer viewed as a strict restriction on
the Commission's ability to initiate action. In fact, federal courts now
assume that actions brought by the Commission are automatically in the
public interest when it is seeking to prevent practices that have the
tendency or capacity to mislead, regardless of the extent of actual injury
to consumers. 146 By way of comparison, the Hangman Ridge court stated
that the "purpose of capacity to deceive test is to deter harmful conduct
before injury occurs,"'147 a purpose closely analogous to Ford Motor's
preventative remedy language. Thus, to the extent that the capacity to
deceive test for unfair or deceptive acts in Washington is designed to
deter deceptive conduct before injury occurs,148 recognition that this
necessarily encompasses acts that affect the public interest would more
closely comport with federal law and FTC decisions. In fact, the purpose
section of the CPA suggests that, given this formulation of the public
interest requirement in FTC actions, it is entirely appropriate for
Washington courts to recognize that acts that have the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public necessarily affect the public
144. The conceptual connection here is that a potential for repetition is in fact conduct that has
the potential to deceive the public.
145. At bottom, the purpose of the public interest element in South Carolina is to preclude the
repetition of potentially harmful acts. The purpose of Washington's capacity-to-deceive test is to
deter deceptive conduct before injury occurs. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title
Ins., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 785, 719 P.2d 531, 535 (1986).
146. PRIDGEN, supra note 22, at 549 (emphasis added) (discussing Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120
F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941), which noted the FTCA was intended to afford a preventative remedy,
not a compensatory one).
147. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 785, 719 P.2d at 535 (emphasis in original).
148. Id.
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interest. 149 Currently, federal courts exercise great deference to the
Commission's actions, concluding that the finding of public interest is a
matter within the broad discretion of the FTC.150
B. Acts that are "Unfair" Necessarily Touch the Public Interest
An alternative way of viewing unfair or deceptive acts as
necessarily touching the public interest is to view the conduct simply in
regards to whether it is "unfair." Washington courts generally do not
address the unfairness element separately, but the definition of an unfair
act indicates that it is not necessarily synonymous with a deceptive act.
The Federal Trade Commission has established the following three
criteria to determine whether an act or practice is unfair, and the
Washington Court of Appeals has adopted these elements in full. 5 ' The
elements are:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law or otherwise-whether, in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law,
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other business
men). 15
2
Included in this definition for "unfair practices" is a prohibition on acts
that violate public policy; an act that does so can rise to the level of"unfair," and be susceptible to a CPA claim.
149. The purpose section of the CPA specifically provides, "[i]t is the intent of the legislature
that, in construing this Act, the courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final
orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same
or similar matters." WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation).
150. PRIDGEN, supra note 22 at 549 (citing Slough v. F.T.C., 396 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir.
1968)). Although Washington's unfair competition statute is nearly identical to the FTCA, and the
Legislature has provided that Washington courts are to follow federal rules of decision in similar
matters as guidance for enforcement of its private cause of action statute, in many ways the FTCA,
which is a statute aimed primarily at preventing deceptive conduct, is significantly different in nature
than a statute conferring a private cause of action to individuals. Still, much of the reasoning for the
public interest requirement was drawn from the FTCA, and the Commission's implicit recognition
that acts which have the capacity to mislead necessarily touch the public interest, is persuasive
authority.
151. See Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Ctr., 40 Wash. App. 302, 310, 698 P.2d 578, 583 (1985);
Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. Bank, 34 Wash. App. 45, 57, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (1983).
152. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
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Concern for violations of public policy, in regards to CPA claims,
first appeared in Reader's Digest Association. 153 There, the Washington
Supreme Court considered whether a promotional sweepstakes
constituted a lottery and an unfair method of competition in violation of
the CPA. After concluding that the sweepstakes constituted a lottery,1
54
the court stated "[w]hat is illegal and against public policy is per se an
unfair trade practice," and, referring to article II, section 24 of the
Washington State Constitution which expressly prohibits lotteries, 55
quickly concluded the lottery was a violation of the CPA. 156 Later, the
Hangman Ridge court modified the Reader's Digest's interpretation of
public interest by acknowledging that, "the use of the term 'public
policy' is a reference to 'public interest,"' and that "public policy in the
context of an 'unfair trade practice' has been replaced by a separate
public interest requirement."'' 57
The link between public policy and public interest, expressly stated
in the Hangman Ridge opinion, is important in the context of what
constitutes unfair conduct. Among the many definitions of what
constitutes an unfair act are acts that "offend[] public policy." Thus,
because the public interest element has subsumed the "illegal and against
public policy" test for deceptive conduct, this subsumption suggests that
unfair conduct may also per se satisfy the public interest requirement.
The Hangman Ridge court suggests that the prohibition of unfair acts and
the public interest requirement are both edifices of "public policy.' 58
153. 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
154. Id. at 259, 501 P.2d at 298.
155. WASH. CONST. art. 11, § 24 ("Lotteries shall be prohibited except as specifically
authorized upon the affirmative vote of sixty percent of the members of each house of the legislature
or, notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, by referendum or initiative approved by
a sixty percent affirmative vote of the electors voting thereon.").
156. Reader's Digest Ass n., 81 Wash. 2d at 270, 501 P.2d at 298.
157. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 786, 719
P.2d 531, 535-36 (1986).
158. The FTC has stated that where courts rely heavily on this factor to support a finding of
unfairness, the policy "should be clear and well-established." ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 18, at 28. Potential sources for what constitutes public policy may be statutes, judicial
decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted by the courts, rather than relying on vague notions of
national values. Id Considerations for public policy have been codified in 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), which
describes the standard of proof for public policy considerations, providing in pertinent part:
The Commission shall have no authority under this section ... to declare unlawful an act
or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the
Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with
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Because they embrace a common element, there must necessarily be
some overlap between them. Thus, where a court proceeds to analyze a
CPA claim on the premise that a seller has engaged in a deceptive act, to
the extent a deceptive act may also be considered an unfair act,' 59 the
requirement to establish independently that the claim is in the public
interest is duplicative.
C. The Capacity to Deceive Test can Serve
as a Barrier to Frivolous CPA Claims.
The public interest element's intended purpose was to eliminate
frivolous claims and prevent purely private disputes from consuming
precious judicial resources.' 60 However, these conceptual underpinnings
are not wedded to the public interest element, and to the extent
Washington courts continue to apply the capacity to deceive test in
evaluating whether an unfair or deceptive act has occurred, frivolous and
wasteful claims can still be eliminated on the basis that they do not have
the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.
1. The Public Interest Element is a Bar to CPA Claims
The public interest element is generally viewed as a method to
prevent the CPA from becoming a private remedy statute, 16 1 and courts
may dismiss cases because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the
requisite public interest impact. 162 For example, in Campbell the plaintiff
had purchased a rebuilt engine from the defendant that included a
"Limited Engine Assembly Warranty," which provided parts and labor
for correction of defects in materials and workmanship for a specified
period of time. 163 Shortly after installing the engine, and within the
warranty period, the engine failed, and Campbell immediately contacted
the defendant to resolve the problem. 64 After inspection, the defendant
concluded that the engine failure was due to owner abuse and was not
covered by the warranty.' 65 The plaintiff refused to pay for service and
labor, and, after the defendant threatened to assert a possessory lien on
all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for
such determination.
159. This topic is beyond the scope of this comment.
160. See Gown, supra note 7, at 805-06.
161. See Gown, supra note 7, at 805-06.
162. See, e.g., Campbell v. Seattle Engine Rebuilders & Remanufacturing, Inc., 75 Wash. App.
89, 96-97, 876 P.2d 948, 953 (1994).
163. Id. at 90, 876 P.2d at 949-50.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 91, 876 P.2d at 950.
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the vehicle, filed a complaint for damages, alleging breach of contract,
violations of the Automotive Repair Act ("ARA"), and violation of the
CPA. 166 The trial court held that the defendant had violated the ARA by
wrongfully asserting a possessory lien on the plaintiffs car, but
dismissed plaintiffs CPA claim, concluding that the plaintiff had failed
to show that the public interest element was met. 167
The Court of Appeals, following the language in Hangman Ridge,
rejected the plaintiffs argument that, while the ARA did not specifically
include a statement of public interest impact, a violation of the ARA
amounts to a per se violation of the CPA because the concept of the
public interest was incorporated throughout the text of the ARA.' 68 The
court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish the public interest
impact factually, and that because the ARA did not include a "specific
legislative declaration of public interest impact" the court was required,
under Hangman Ridge, to affirm the dismissal of the CPA claim.169
The Campbell court, while dismissing the plaintiffs CPA claim,
seemed willing to admit this was an unfair result.' 70 In the final footnote
of the Campbell decision, the court noted that the Legislature had in fact
amended the ARA, subsequent to commencement of the action, to
provide the clear legislative declaration of public interest contemplated
by the Hangman Ridge court.1 71 Yet the court felt bound to ignore this
amendment and to consider the statute as it was drafted at the time the
action was commenced. The hyper-technical result in Cambpell is,
unfortunately, not far-fetched, given the nature of the public interest
inquiry. The later amendment reflects the notion that the ARA is a
comprehensive body of law regulating the business conduct that affects,
on a regular basis, the entire population. Clearly a violation of the ARA
is, as confirmed by the subsequent amendment, sufficient to give rise to a
CPA cause of action. Had the court been willing to consider the
166. Id.
167. id. at 91-92, 876 P.2d at 950.
168. Id. at 96, 876 P.2d at 952-953.
169. Id. at 97, 876 P.2d at 953. Obviously this court did not consider the fact that there was a
per se unfair trade practice as indicative of any per se public interest element, which on some level
disputes the point this Article is attempting to make. However, per se unfair trade practice and per se
public interest are different "animals" under the CPA private cause of action, and the court's
decision not to view one as affecting the other is explainable on these grounds.
170. Id. at 97 n.5.
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.71.070 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 legislation) provides:
"The legislature finds that the practices covered by this chapter are matters vitally affecting the
public interest for the purpose of applying the Consumer Protection Act."
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deceptive nature of the conduct and its potential for repetition, this
absurd result might have been avoided. 172
While the public interest element is often a formidable barrier to
overcome, it does not follow that eliminating the public interest element
will open the floodgates of litigation. As of the time of this writing,
Washington is the only state that has adopted the "capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public" unfair or deceptive acts analysis. 73 The
decision to include this language in the unfair or deceptive acts test
suggests that this standard is not, or should not, be considered a lenient
standard. To the extent Washington courts have regarded this standard as
toothless, its subsumption of the public interest element indicates that
this test can and does raise the level of proof for unfair or deceptive acts
and the capacity to deceive test should be regarded as a barrier to
frivolous claims. Therefore, requiring litigants to show that conduct has
risen to the level of an unfair or deceptive act that has the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public prevents the CPA from
becoming a tool for "opportunistic, vexatious private suits."' 74 While the
public interest requirement serves an important role of limiting the broad
language in the unfair practice section, particularly when a victory for the
plaintiff may entail the possibility of attorney's fees and punitive
damages,17 5 the relevant cases demonstrate that merely showing that an
act is unfair or deceptive is not sufficient to satisfy the first element of
the Hangman Ridge test unless the plaintiff can also demonstrate that the
act had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public., 76 The
172. There is actually a substantial list of statutes the violation of which is legislatively
declared as both constituting an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting commerce, and vitally
affecting the public interest. See supra note 91. This is by no means an equation of the two
standards, but it supports the argument that many unfair or deceptive acts, because of their deceptive
nature, will affect the public interest. One can at least accept this as implicit legislative recognition
of the similarity between these two standards. Along these lines, statutes that declare their violation
to constitute an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting trade or commerce should at the very least
be a consideration in establishing whether that misconduct affects the public interest. Where litigants
cannot factually demonstrate public interest impact and are attempting to make a per se showing, all
too often courts have considered the lack of a legislative declaration of public interest impact as
necessarily implicating lack of public interest and grounds for dismissal. This need not necessarily
be the case, yet a strict reading of Hangman Ridge seems to instruct courts to do just this. This is, as
Campbell demonstrates, an extremely limited scope of interpretation.
173. This author's search has not revealed any other jurisdictions that formulate their unfair or
deceptive standards in this way.
174. Gown, supra note 7, at 806.
175. Gown, supra note 7, at 806-07.
176. This has been described as a lenient standard, WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
WASHINGTON ANTITRUST AND CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK, 88 (David J. Dadoun ed.,
2001), and, to the extent that courts do consider this a lenient standard, this Article suggests this
proposition should be re-evaluated.
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"capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public" language is a
barrier to meretricious lawsuits that are essentially private disputes
outside the intended scope of the CPA.
2. The Capacity to Deceive Test can be Used as a Device
to Bar Frivolous and/or Purely Private Disputes
Cases do exist in which a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated
that an unfair or deceptive act has occurred, yet has failed to demonstrate
the requisite public interest impact. In these cases, the plaintiffs failure
to demonstrate public interest impact is not based on the Hangman Ridge
public interest formulations, but rather a failure to meet the capacity to
deceive test, and is thus a failure to demonstrate that an unfair or
deceptive act has occurred.
One such case is Reeves v. Teuscher, 77 in which the defendant,
Teuscher, along with his broker, sold interest in 2,400 acres of property
to twelve unsophisticated real estate investors who were seeking low-risk
investments. The plaintiffs eventually brought suit against Teuscher,
alleging that he had misrepresented the value and investment potential of
the land, and asserted, among other claims, that Teuscher had violated
the CPA. 178 The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs on all their
claims, and on appeal, Teuscher argued there was insufficient evidence
to support a CPA claim. 179
The Teuscher court found that there was ample evidence that
Teuscher and his broker had engaged in unfair or deceptive acts that had
the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. 180 Specifically,
Teuscher had represented the property as being an excellent, low-risk
investment, and had made these representations and solicitations to many
investors in the hopes of luring investors with large amounts of cash. 18'
With regard to the public interest requirement, the court characterized the
transaction as a private dispute, and held that there was sufficient
evidence of public interest impact because the defendant was engaged in
active solicitation, and was in a superior bargaining position. 82 Again,
the very acts which led to the potential for widespread deception of the
177. 881 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Washington law).
178. Id. at 1497-98. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Washington and Oregon securities acts.
179. Id.
180. Id.at 1502.
181. Id. The court concluded that "these actions had the capacity to deceive, and did so."
(emphasis added) Id.
182. Id. (emphasis added).
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public were the dispositive factors in holding that the public interest
requirement was met.
In addition to the twelve investors, there was another plaintiff in
Teuscher, Sadri, who was a seasoned investor with ten to fifteen years of
experience selling and developing residential and commercial real
estate.18 3 Sadri and Teuscher, after months of negotiation, consolidated
their assets to form a limited partnership with plans to develop the 2,400
acres. 184 Emphasizing that Sadri did not occupy a different bargaining
position than Teuscher, the court held that Sadri had not made a
sufficient showing of public interest impact. 185 However, in determining
that Sadri had failed to demonstrate public interest impact, the court
noted that, unlike the case of the twelve unsophisticated investors,
Teuscher had not actively advertised to or solicited Sadri.186 Thus,
regardless of the fact that Sadri and Teuscher appeared to have dealt at
arm's length and occupied equal bargaining positions, the adverse
judgment on Sadri's claims can be justified on the basis that the unfair or
deceptive acts about which Sadri complained did not exhibit the capacity
to deceive a substantial portion of the public, and thus were materially
different from those made to the twelve unsophisticated investors.1 87
Another case that demonstrates that a lack of public interest
showing, Aubrey's R. V Center, Inc v. Tandy Corp.,8 8 can also be
explained based on the plaintiffs failure to show that the unfair or
deceptive act did not exhibit the capacity to deceive a substantial portion
of the public. In Tandy, the plaintiff brought breach of contract and CPA
claims against Tandy after a computer system the plaintiff had purchased
from Tandy failed to perform as represented.189 Tandy supplied all of the
hardware and some of the software, which he carried, and referred the
plaintiff to a resource book that catalogued software programmed by
183. Id. at 1503.
184. Id.
185. Id.; cf Pac. Northwest Life Ins. Co. v. Turnbull, 51 Wash. App. 692, 703, 754 P.2d 1262,
1268-69 (1988) (rejecting a CPA claim on grounds that plaintiffs had a "history of business
experience" and were not representative of bargainers subject to exploitation and unable to protect
themselves, but failing to state whether the acts complained of reached the level of unfair or
deceptive acts).
186. Id.
187. These differences are offered as a potential explanation for why, in the case of the
inexperienced investors, the public interest element was clearly satisfied, yet in Sadri's case it was
not. While a misrepresentation is certainly is an unfair or deceptive act, misrepresentations to one
individual, who happened to be an individual with extensive experience in real estate investment,
without advertisement or solicitations, likely would not deceive a substantial portion of the public.
188.46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987).
189. Id. at 598, 731 P.2d at 1126.
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third parties that would be compatible on Tandy's systems.190 Tandy had
a policy of not supporting or servicing these programs and, although this
policy was printed on the resource book, Tandy's agent failed to verbally
notify the plaintiff of the policy.19' Ultimately, both Tandy's and the
third-party's software failed to perform as represented, and the plaintiff
sued to rescind the entire contract. 192 The trial court found in favor of the
buyer. 9
3
On appeal, the court first found that Tandy's action did constitute
an unfair or deceptive act because its "fail[ure] to inform potential buyers
of Source Book software that those programs were not backed by Tandy
has the 'capacity to deceive"' satisfied the first prong of the Hangman
test. 194 It nevertheless reversed the trial court's decision awarding the
plaintiff damages under the CPA on grounds that the public interest
requirement was not met. 95 Characterizing the dispute as a consumer
transaction, the court noted that, although the act did occur within the
course of the seller's business, there was little likelihood of repetition
because the plaintiff had failed to show that it was part of a generalized
course of conduct, and there was no showing that other consumers had in
fact been deceived. 196
The court, however, could have easily dismissed the plaintiffs
CPA claim for failure to show an unfair or deceptive act, and its failure
to do so is best explained by pointing to the various shortcomings of the
Tandy court's analysis. First, although the court properly stated that
unfair or deceptive acts must have the capacity to deceive a substantial
portion of the public, the court ultimately concluded that Tandy's
conduct was unfair or deceptive because it "had the capacity to deceive,"
and apparently omitted the substantial capacity portion of the test. Thus,
it is not clear whether the court addressed this portion of the test. 197 Even
if the court is given the benefit of the doubt, however, its decision is still
problematic because it overlooked the fact that there was, printed on the
resource book itself, a warning that third-party software was not
supported. 98 Thus, while the plaintiff in this particular case may not
190. Id. at 597, 731 P.2d at 1126.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 599, 731 P.2d at 1127.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 609, 731 P.2d at 1132.
195. Id. at 609-10, 731 P.2d at 1132.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The court noted that a disclaimer was printed in the source book. Furthermore, whether
the agent had in fact notified the plaintiff was an issue at trial.
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have received a verbal warning, the fact that there was a printed warning
on the resource book itself would militate against a finding of a capacity
to deceive a substantial portion of the public.
Moreover, the Tandy court's reasoning is contradictory. While
holding that Tandy's conduct was deceptive because it failed to inform
potential buyers that the resource book software was not backed by any
guaranty, 199 it also held that because there was no evidence that other
consumers had actually been affected by Tandy's conduct, there was
likely no affect on the public interest. 200 This was a misapplication of the
test because actual deception is not dispositive in determining whether
201public interest has been shown. In addition, the court seemed to
implicitly acknowledge that if other buyers had been deceived, the
plaintiff might have been able to satisfy the public interest
requirement. 20 2 This is an inquiry a court would be required to make in
determining whether unfair or deceptive acts have the capacity to deceive
a substantial portion of the public.
D. Interpreting Unfair or Deceptive Acts that have the Capacity to
Deceive a Substantial Portion of the Public as Satisfying the Public
Interest Requirement is Consistent with the Language of the CPA
Eliminating the public interest requirement is not inconsistent with
the purpose section of the CPA because the capacity to deceive test will
still prevent private litigants from bringing causes of action that are not
injurious to the public. In addition, the language of the purpose section
can be interpreted to suggest that unfair acts necessarily touch the public
interest.
Proponents of the public interest requirement, including the
Hangman Ridge court, have drawn much support from the language of
the purpose section of the CPA, which states that "this act shall not be
construed to prohibit practices which . . .are not injurious to the public
interest.',203 However, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, many
199. Aubrey's R.V. Ctr., Inc v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 609, 731 P.2d 1124, 1132
(1987) (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 610.
201. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 785, 719
P.2d 531, 535 (1986).
202. In particular, the court focused on the fact that the acts were not shown to be part of a
particularized course of conduct, that there was no showing of repeated acts, that there was little
likelihood of repetition, and that mere speculation is insufficient to show a potential for repetition.
Tandy, 46 Wash. App. at 609-610, 731 P.2d at 1132. However, the conduct in Nordstrom, Travis,
and Sign-O-Lite Sign, was found to have had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the
public precisely because it exhibited a generalized course of conduct and the potential for repetition.
203. See supra note 67.
[Vol. 29:1
2005] Public Interest Requirement under Washington 's CPA 239
courts have implicitly recognized a functional equivalence between acts
that have the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public and
acts that affect the public interest. Therefore, the capacity to deceive test
can act as a mechanism for eliminating CPA claims are that not injurious
to the public, and is precisely consistent with the language of the purpose
section. Because there is no functional distinction between an act that has
the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public and an act that
affects the public interest, the public interest element can be dispensed
with as a prerequisite to a private cause of action consistent with the
language in the purpose section of the CPA.
Furthermore, because an unfair or deceptive act is one that has the
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public, the language of
the CPA can be interpreted as lending support to the proposition that, in
conferring upon the public a private cause of action for violations of
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020, the legislature recognized that acts which
are unfair or deceptive and have the capacity for repetition implicitly
satisfy the public interest element. The judicially-imposed public interest
requirement is based on two key phrases in the purpose section of the
Act,2° 4 which state that the purpose of the CPA is to "complement the
body of federal law governing restraints on trade, unfair competition, and
unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the
public, ' '20 5 and that the Act should not be interpreted to "prohibit acts or
practices that are not injurious to the public interest. ' '20 6 The first section
discusses unfair and deceptive acts together with protecting the public in
the same sentence, however, the second sentence refers merely to acts
that are not injurious to the public interest. While this statement can be
read as affirmatively requiring private parties to demonstrate a public
interest in addition to conduct that was unfair or deceptive, it is also
equally plausible that the purpose section essentially equates unfair acts
with those that necessarily affect the public interest. Thus, where a court
determines that an unfair or deceptive act has the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public, the purpose section can be read as
suggesting that deterring this conduct is necessarily in the public's
interest. 2 °7
204. See supra note 67.
205. See supra note 67.
206. See supra note 67.
207. Although there are no cases in Washington that have directly interpreted the purpose
section in this manner, cases such as Nordstrom, Travis, Sign-O-Lite, Hiner, and Burbo, discussed in
Section IV.A.1-2 supra, implicitly lend support to this interpretation because they essentially treat
an act that has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public as necessarily satisfying the
public interest requirement. In addition, the references to "public policy" that underlie both the
Seattle University Law Review
V. CONCLUSION
Private causes of action under Washington's CPA have come a long
way since Lightfoot. Although the Hangman Ridge court did reaffirm the
public interest element, the debate over the vitality of the public interest
requirement must again resurface because the standard for proving unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in Washington has evolved to the extent
that it has subsumed the function of the public interest requirement. The
primary reason why the public interest element has lost its independent
legal significance is because deceptive conduct that has the capacity to
deceive a substantial portion of the public is harmful behavior that
necessarily affects the public interest. Washington state court opinions
nearly equate the function of the capacity to deceive test and the public
interest requirement.20 8 Thus, given the direction in which the law for
unfair or deceptive acts or practices has developed in Washington, as
well as the way the public interest requirement is treated in other
jurisdictions, the public interest requirement should be abolished as
immaterial to the analysis of a Washington CPA claim.
Furthermore, private actions that have been dismissed on grounds
that the plaintiff failed to make the requisite public interest showing are
just as easily dismissed on grounds that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that an unfair or deceptive act exhibited the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the public. The capacity to deceive test is a unique
formulation found only in Washington, and, as the language suggests,
should not be interpreted as an easy burden to carry. To this extent, it
serves as an adequate barrier to frivolous and purely private disputes.
The most effective way to retract the public interest element would
be a judicial decision recognizing the inherent similarity between unfair
or deceptive acts and the public interest requirement. Alternatively, the
Legislature could amend Washington's private causes of action statute to
state affirmatively that no public interest showing is necessary to sustain
209a private cause of action.
The public interest requirement has become an unnecessary and
duplicative element of private causes of action under the Washington
CPA. Because its independent legal significance has diminished through
time, continued attempts to apply the public interest element are a hollow
public interest element and an "unfair" act also suggest that unfair acts necessarily affect the public
interest. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
208. See supra Part IV.A.
209. A simple, effective statement to the effect of: "Proof of public interest or public injury
shall not be required in any action brought under this section." This language is borrowed from
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 10g(a) (2004).
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exercise that can only serve, once again, to muddy the waters of private
causes of action under the CPA.
